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E-money and e-commerce:
Two alternative views of
future innovations
Some in the banking industry have
wrung their hands over the slow adop-
tion of debit cards, e-cash, electronic
bill payment, financial electronic data
interchange (FEDI), and smart cards
in the U.S. Whether or not these in-
novations grow swiftly, this subject is
important for several reasons. First,
payment services bring in significant
revenues for financial institutions,
and changes in technology could im-
pact future revenues. Second, a cor-
nerstone of policy on issues of safety,
soundness, and consumer protection
is the assumption that a significant
portion of financial services activity
flows through “trusted” financial insti-
tutions. As a result, it is important for
policymakers, the industry, and the
public to understand the broad impli-
cations of technology for the payments
mechanism and banking.
How will the future path of electron-
ic payment systems be determined?
One school of thought argues that
a number of obstacles and barriers
stand in the way of e-payment innova-
tions and that these will need to be
addressed before e-payment technol-
ogies can be successful. Other studies
have suggested an alternative theory—
that the advent of the Internet will
cause revolutionary changes in bank-
ing and commerce requiring funda-
mentally new payment systems to
evolve.1 At the root of this debate are
several questions. Why do some inno-
vations succeed and others fail? How
do these changes occur? Are e-money
innovations and the supporting law
and technology infrastructure driven
by planning for future needs or by
focusing more narrowly on past prob-
lems? Will the innovations be spurred
by current institutions or by non-
traditional providers?
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I provide an
overview of developments in e-money
systems and commerce. I then ex-
plore research on the economics of
innovation to put these changes in a
broader context. Lastly, I analyze the
potential implications of changes in
banking and commerce for the evo-
lution of e-money. In the process, I
build on a theory advanced by Clayton
Christianson that aims to explain and
predict how different product inno-
vations do or do not occur.2
The changing nature of commerce
The nature of commerce will contin-
ue to change with the growing famil-
iarity of the Internet and the World
Wide Web. Use of the World Wide
Web is on track to reach a critical mass
of U.S. households many times more
quickly than the telephone did when
it was introduced into American house-
holds. The Gartner Group predicts
that over $7 trillion worth of business-
to-business (B2B) commerce will be
conducted electronically in 2004 and
over $380 billion of business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) commerce will be con-
ducted electronically in 2003.3 While
the last five years have seen firms ex-
periment with the Internet to adver-
tise the availability of products and
to offer services for sale in a transac-
tion capacity, more fundamental
changes in commerce have begun to
emerge. Consider Ebay, which allows
consumers to trade with consumers
without a direct intermediary, creating
a fundamentally new market of buy-
ers and sellers who would otherwise
have been unlikely to find one anoth-
er. Yet, while providing important
benefits, this new commercial environ-
ment also exposes consumers to risks
that they may not be accustomed to
managing, such as finality of payments
and recourse in case of untimely
delivery or poor quality. Similarly,
emerging Internet-based B2B portals
may offer significant improvements
to market participants, but again may
potentially expose them to important
risks, relating to seller performance,
buyer financial stability, and dispute
resolution.
Changing nature of payment systems
As one would expect, payment systems
have been evolving to meet the chang-
ing needs of buyers and sellers. New
payment instruments are being created
to expand the reach of the payments
infrastructure that has been in place
for decades; current systems are being
reengineered at the fringe; and fun-
damentally new payment systems are
being developed as well. For in-
stance, while the development of new
e-cash technologies continues to be
explored, PayPal, an Internet payment
mechanism, puts a “new front end”
on existing credit card and ACH (au-
tomated clearing house) networks to
make them more convenient for con-
sumers and to allow consumers to send
money to each other. Paper checks
are being converted to electronic
transactions and cleared via the ACH
and ATM (automated teller machine)
networks by some retailers as a device
to reduce check-clearing costs and to
begin to wean some consumers from
checks. Some organizations are also
exploring the use of ATM networks
and the ACH for Internet transactions
in order to offer a lower cost alterna-
tive to credit cards. Some retailers
have also implemented store-based
debit cards that are cleared and set-
tled over the ACH rather than ATM
networks, again to reduce costs while
broadening the store’s relationship
with its customers.That organizations are using “differ-
ent payment networks” for “similar”
commercial purposes and the “same
payment networks” for “very different”
commercial reasons is not a new phe-
nomenon. For instance, for decades
some organizations have used checks
for payments of hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars rather than using
large-dollar, real-time funds transfer
systems. Other organizations have
traditionally used large-dollar, real-
time funds transfer systems to make
fairly modest-sized payments. Some
of these events are motivated by the
fact that it is easier to pay using “pre-
set mechanisms” than to change to a
new system for infrequent transac-
tions. At other times, decisions are
driven by a payment instrument’s
“special features.” For example, a
firm might use checks for large-dollar
payments to slow down the process
for exchanging funds or to improve its
negotiating leverage with a supplier.
On other occasions, a firm might use
large-dollar payments mechanisms to
guarantee timely payment. Thus, a
significant amount of pressure is ex-
erted on payment systems as various
parties attempt to push innovations
with certain characteristics or to lever-
age other instruments for their rela-
tive strengths.
Payment innovations
How does the process of innovation
occur? There are two general, com-
plementary theories of how new prod-
ucts are adopted. The first theory, the
new product diffusion model, assumes
that the primary determinant of new
product adoption is the time it takes
customers to learn about a product,
to experiment with it, and then ulti-
mately to use it. This theory assumes
that customers view a new product or
service as a clear substitute for past
products. These types of innovations
essentially “sustain” or “extend”
the current product (see figure 1).
Christianson notes that new entrants
in this market will tend to find it
harder to enter successfully against
incumbent competitors, who can roll
out innovations profitably to their
existing customer bases.
The second theory, the new market
development model, suggests that some
innovations—disruptive technolo-
gies—lead to new products or services
that by themselves have a limited mar-
ket potential (see figure 1). This the-
ory suggests that, in order to reach
mass markets, firms need to offer ad-
ditional product features and/or in-
frastructure, tailoring the product
to new uses and to nontraditional
customers. In many of these cases,
Christianson suggests that “new” or
“nontraditional” providers tend to
have an advantage over incumbent
firms since they have the freedom to
focus on fringe benefits rather than
focusing on mass market needs.4
Why haven’t e-payments succeeded?
Theory 1: Product diffusion
Building on new product diffusion
theory, some studies cite a laundry
list of barriers standing in the way of
e-payment innovations. On the de-
mand side, studies have cited customer
resistance or inertia, lack of incentives,
and lack of customer awareness of the
innovation as obstacles to change. On
the supply side, studies have pointed
to the lack of clear standards, the need
to overcome industry fragmentation,
inadequate incentives among incum-
bents, and the presence of network
externalities. This theory assumes
implicitly that a significant portion of
e-payment innovations are clear sub-
stitutes for existing services and that
additional work by incumbent firms
alone or in collaboration will lead to
broad acceptance.








the lines between bank-
ing and commerce.
While it is both natural
and critical for incum-
bent firms to experi-
ment, this theory
suggests that these in-
novations tend to un-
leash improvements
that incumbents may not find valuable
in the short- or mid-term. Some ob-
servers may suggest that incumbent
firms in these industries “do not un-
derstand their markets” or “are not
adequately investing in the future.”
However, Christianson finds that in-
cumbent firms, for purely profit maxi-
mizing reasons, may not want to choose
to pioneer some of these innovations
themselves, leaving other firms with
different specialties to do so.
Blurring lines of banking
and commerce
Figure 2 provides an overview of the
historical changes underway in the
financial services industry. Looking
back 20 years, banks competed prima-
rily on the basis of geography. With
the advent of deregulation and tech-
nology, significant changes occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s with the emer-
gence of more product-based institu-
tions. It is not clear how the industry
structure will progress in the 21st
century, but future models of financial
services might include: 1) a universal
bank that bundles a broad range of
financial products and services under
one roof for a broad range of custom-
ers,5 2) an institution that focuses on
the broad financial and nonfinancial
needs of a narrow segment of the
market,6 3) a “virtual portal’ or “aggre-
gator” that uses technology to inte-
grate financial services from a variety
of specialized providers,7 or 4) a tra-
ditional, financial institution, which
focuses on a limited number of finan-
cial products.
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According to the new market devel-
opment theory, many of the so-called
obstacles and barriers to innovation
may be better viewed as symptoms
of the broader changes underway,
rather than as problems per se. For
example, a larger number of finan-
cial institutions may need to have a
broader relationship with customers
(i.e., a move towards universal bank-
ing). In these cases, institutions may
be able to invest in e-payment inno-
vations as a cost of doing business
for obtaining the customer’s broader
business, rather than purely as a reve-
nue generator.8 As a second example,
a larger fraction of
customers may need
to become more will-
ing to accept fee-based
services rather than
bundled services.9 In
this case, rising con-
sumer receptivity to
fees could spur poten-
tial innovations. In a
third example, some
e-money innovations




are more closely integrated (i.e., a
move towards the second model).10
A payment systems framework
The above discussion makes it clear
that payment systems questions are
complex, involve a significant num-
ber of interrelated issues associated
with commercial relationships, tech-
nology, the law, and business practic-
es, and involve coordination among
a variety of parties with different
and sometimes competing interests.
Adding to the complexity of these
relationships, payment systems












pre-1980s 1980–1990s 2000 and beyond
involve long-term infrastructure invest-
ments, which evolve slowly over time.
As a result, it is critical to evaluate pay-
ment systems changes in a broader
context, which recognizes the various
component factors, including the na-
ture of the commercial relationship
as well as the nature of the payment
systems used. See figure 3 for a graph-
ical schematic of the simplified pay-
ments relationship. Frameworks like
this one allow for more careful analysis
of which innovations are clear substi-
tutes for one another and the poten-
tial implications for different parties.
Conclusion
This article provides an alternative
theory to the traditional “obstacles
and barriers” theory for explaining
why some e-money innovations have
not succeeded more quickly. In the
process, it provides a framework for
characterizing new innovations as well
as better understanding where, when,
how, and by whom these new innova-
tions will occur.
This theory has potentially important
implications for public policy. In terms
of safety and soundness policy, some
would argue that the growing role of
nonbanks will pose significant ques-
tions to safety and soundness. Yet, the




















Ordered online, fulfilled manually
Ordered and fulfilled electronically
Payment instruments:
Checks, cash, money orders,
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Clearing houses and networks:
Fedwire, CHIPS, book entry,
net settlement, ACH, credit card
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suggests that nonbanks will not neces-
sarily replace the functions of banks
but rather provide parts of services
that financial institutions do not have
a comparative advantage in provid-
ing.11 Second, much of consumer
protection policy is based around
bundling protections around a few
fairly common banking products. To
the degree that commerce and bank-
ing continue to mingle, public authori-
ties may need to be particularly careful
about attempting to regulate the rel-
ative rights, warranties, and incentives
associated with alternative e-money
implementations, leaving markets to
influence the outcomes.12
It should be noted that the above types
of questions are not new. Indeed,
banking and commercial markets have
been facing these types of issues for
years. The above points are observa-
tions advanced as a theory for how
e-money systems may evolve. Clearly,
these are not resolved questions; rath-
er they are questions warranting care-
ful monitoring. More importantly, the
policy implications for private sector
and public sector leaders may be
quite different depending on one’s
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